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Posts Tagged ‘economics’

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Global leadership opinion: Where will the West turn for its survival?

In Uncategorized on December 23, 2025 at 1:22 pm

WALKING DOWNTOWN MANHATTAN craning the Twin Towers in the summer of 2001, capitalism had won, and won big. Mid-70s to the fin de millénaire, democratic nations doubled in number. From Portugal’s Carnation Revolution to Eastern Europe’s assimilation. Liberalism lifted the world, crushing hellscape communism and fascism. Back in Britain that year, a mid-Atlantic drawl was everywhere: “Enjoy!”

Now, 19 years of democratic recession, a debt crisis, expose Western systems as frail. In our hubristic flush we assumed democratic capitalism was downloadable. Run by a dull-administrative-class alert to the ruinous. The presumption of continuous growth handed agency from politics to borg-institutions, who bent, then snapped their public-mood antennae.

Under all is our obsession with liberty. A history-busting-run at Western freedom is under threat by liberalism transmogrifying into nihilism. The strongmen and tech disruptors’ wells of ressentiment are accelerating an end to post-war sensibilities. They have mastered narrative speed and promised breakthrough-innovation (Norman Mailer: ‘Technology is erotic’).

The tediously long years of the UK’s conservative government between 2010-‘24, was aversion to agency. Characterising Western paralysis. Unlike 1951-’64 (consolidating post-war consensus), and ‘79-’97 (economic re-balancing). Two periods of consequential power. The UK’s four decades of ‘Brussels make the rules’ has drippified British politics. The ontic wake-up has only just started.

The EU, a constitution-eating bureaucratic monster, nudged the UK’s two main parties to become an undifferentiated liberal uniparty. Britain’s Liberal Party proper last won a general election in 1906 and were a spent force by the 1950s. The Conservative (sort of Republican) and Labour (sort of Democrat) parties absorbed deep-seated liberalising moods, shunting their former constitutional-beliefs to the margins. The unifying elements of the two main parties, imperialism (Conservative) and clubbish-socialism (Labour), gradually faded as people sensed genuine social change beneath their feet. An effective constitution being measured by the glacial inexorability of its Goldilocks economics: Not too hot, not too cold, just right.

The temptation of unities

Now, the idealogues on the reactionary right have gained traction as the uniparty has not restrained liberal excesses. Both market and social liberalism have become enchanted by extreme variation. Extremes tend towards ideological unities, which themselves require modern efficiency. The constant appeal within UK politics to modernise into an efficiency-state has been undermined by an inbuilt British transgressiveness. Germany, Japan and even the United States are regarded with a measure of suspicion for their unifying proclivities.

Britain’s post-war self-loathing was not a result of colonial overreach alone, but having spent too long under imperial sermonising about unity. If you are an empire, constant self-justification wears the soul. Learning to love a post-imperial nation is a work of quiet courage. Post-empire we are surprised by our attractive sensibilities. We scan the room and note, we are not that bad after all. But, tempted towards unities. Many of which are illusions. Such as a state-nation in place of a nation-state.

A monumental challenge is to steer, and not destroy our rules-based system, its built-in insurances, civil society’s cohesion, and nation-state autonomy, within a functioning global economy. One that prefers transparency rather than a world of murky state protectionism and eccentric deal-making.

After the nihilism, what?

It is worth reminding that liberal democracy is civil society. Civil society being that plural liberal space we occupy and sustain through constant compromise. Not screaming across the abyss, but crossing it to negotiate with those we profoundly disagree with. For the engine of Western freedom stems from the private realm, the collaborating trusts and mutual partnerships.

And this is a very modern phenomenon, an outturn of the Protestant Reformation’s separation of spheres (politics, religion, economics, family life). This mindset of self-governance defeated the totalising unities of the Catholic Church’s hierarchical social frames. It spawned the myriad voluntary associations, and supercharged industrial capitalism’s distribution of wealth. But we are newly fragile, suffering the enervating effects of supra-institutionalisation. Western confidence is at an all-time low and we are in search of renewal.

Among other egregious illusions is the assumption economic growth itself builds civil society. That is, as social mobility slows, economic hyper-individualism will perpetuate openness and tolerance that previously came from an open public square. By contracting Western institutions to determine the good on our behalf they have drifted into infantile functionalism, distributing liberal rights and privileges devoid of negotiation and compromise. We cannot switch off this machine’s autopilot, with the stark awareness that, as Daniel Bell puts it, “The national state has become too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems”. 

Up to the end of the Cold War, as another writer offers, we were a “centrally organised, rigidly bounded, and hysterically concerned with impenetrable boundaries” which have now given way to a world “in which territorial, ideological, and issue boundaries are attenuated, unclear, and confusing”. The boundary was of course inter-locking international agreements, civil society, with private bodies and individuals as principal arbiters of the good, with their hard yards of moderation.

The collapse of Western institutional legitimacy has meant a lurch from international rules to unrestrained liberalism. Naivete has permitted overspend, supranationalism, an AI gamble, as a means to sustain ‘sacred’ growth above moral authority. This has working communities, those who persist in civil society’s ritual of sustained interaction, as losers in the extreme liberal experiment, craving security.

Motorville and Workington Man throwing spanners in the works

As a result, the working public is on the move, hunting leaders with moral seriousness who can arrest institutional overreach. Motorville, USA, the New Deal Democrat heartland states, has turned red (Republican). Why? Trump is a fighter, they say. In the UK, Workington Man, possessing Motorville’s white post-industrial discontents, is heading towards its version of Trumpism, at speed. Largely with the intent of lobbing a spanner into the machinery. It must be careful for what unities it wishes.

Britain and Europe have allowed sufficient dissolving of negotiated settlements, with their loci of love and politics, and their visible measurable outcomes, to invite authoritarianism. The UK, France and Germany are heading towards populist government at their next elections. America has already responded by gutting the Republican Party of its patrician class. The post-war moderate order, the passive centrists (PCs) trusted a growth model (unending expansion of liberal democracy), not least when its hard power failed in Iraq and Afghanistan, which remain strategic mysteries.

911, it turns out, has had lasting strategic impact. An unseen, unlocatable enemy, wake politicians in the night, and has led to salami sliced civil liberties, and security overreach. A patient, slow-burn UK populace, whose fur is often available for stroking, is roused from its post-war stupor.

In the UK, patrician institutions, such as the BBC, an expanded public sector, even the Church of England, are Fur Strokers in Chief, as they represent the hinterland between extreme liberalism and civil society. They are asked to reassure, by offering the language of a shared consciousness that restrains any sense of a fragile social order. They are split between serving and pacifying.

Bounded liberal capitalism worked because it was put to work generating wealth and well-being within the human settlements it served, measured by the quality of service at the point of delivery. Business and civic society knew who its principal client was. But untrammelled optimism thought, in time, China would, on the back of trade, capitulate to Westerners’ commodious living.

The passive centrists as the new extremists

Trumpism and the Trump Era (ten years of influence) has, in the UK and parts of Europe, exposed the radical centre not as just complacent, but rabidly against action, a violent laissez faire’ism. The EU’s performance leave ribs aching. These are aggressive non-aggressives. You will be passive, and let da system hum and whirr. Trumpism is irking the passionate ‘do nothing’ majority here.

Passive centrism, aggressively passive, points to unities that deny any sense of ultimacy. As in: ‘Ultimate concern for what is ultimately important’. Imperialism, solidarity-socialism, and extreme liberalism are unities that avoid notions of what is possible, and begs the question of what overarching objectives does a modern Western polity reach for next. Is there anything in our inheritance that can anchor our ship?

19th century critic John Ruskin saw a modernism (education and arts) where the images of Christ, as Western civilisation’s ultimacy, its square root of culture, being squeezed out of the canon, and with society denying this ommission to itself in the process. Modernity (society and culture) has then done the same, shunted the horizon out of its dialectic. If the Present Age is turning to reacquaint itself with something real it starts with an agreement that we are, in fact, denying what is possible. Or, as W B Yeats puts it:

“The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity”

In The Second Coming Yeats offers another image, the beast-cynic, on his way to re-birth. Weary Willie’s poetry gave in to temptation. He starts Vacillation with a flash of honesty: “Between extremities, Man runs his course”. And slides into disillusionment, seeing more in Homer’s and Shakespeare’s complacent centrism than Christ’s ultimacy.

The PCs have reacted similarly against ultimacy. Christ rejects the synagogue’s rabbi fast-track programme, striking out for the top of the horizon, but the centre prefer him as itinerant prophet-wanderer. The centre’s mumbler, denying Christ as reality realist (T S Eliot). Eliot restores Christ into modernism’s imagery. But misses that Christ was the first modern man, and is not leading us back to the grinding authority of Eliot’s rediscovered orthodoxies.

The PCs respond to the expansionist aspirations of China, who wish to roll back, with Russia and others, the influence of the West, and especially the USA’s global dominance, with all the critical response of a noctambulist. The institutionalised are three iterations behind reality, and, probably unwittingly, have made the fatal slip from cynicism into disillusionment.

Cynicism in the Western vision is a category error. Modernity itself is not a cynical reaction. Reactions to modernity oft are, but the modern itself is not a cynical response to tradition. Modernity, as The New, was and is always there. But modernity itself does not have to unify in place of dialogue.

3rd c. biographer Diogenes Laertius offers Plato’s man in a modern category, labelled functionally as a ‘featherless bi-ped’: “Plato defined man thus: “Man is a two-footed, featherless animal,” and was much praised for the definition; so Diogenes [the Cynic] plucked a cock and brought it into his school, and said, “This is Plato’s man.” 

““And I,” said he, “am Diogenes the dog.” And when he was asked to what actions of his it was owing that he was called a dog, he said, “Because I fawn upon those who give me anything, and bark at those who give me nothing, and bite the rogues.” 

So, cynicism has an ability to explore reality, but collapses like Yeats in its inability to offer a path. Populism is built from a cynical offering of unities. And the centrists have fallen into the same vision of modernity.

What centrist governance does not spot during democratic expansion is the extent of its infantilising and categorising, transferring parliamentary sovereignty into a chop technocracy. That is, centrism entered the ‘broken middle’ between dystopia and utopia, but only to over-unify. The technocrat, at a personal level, cannot stomach the necessary messiness of growth, so grab the sensation of unified order. ‘Practical duty’ without a horizon.

Diogenes the dog fawns over physics as a means to understanding, with its visible frames of connections across space and time, but barks at the moment of truth. Ordinary people on the ground, in their creative absurdity, cannot see that technocracy’s boilerplate is a loss of consciousness.

As we face completeness in the West, it turns out to be an illusion of unities. We should not be surprised how so many are in fierce agreement. In fact, everyone in the room. The West, even in its achievements, is being lowered steadily. To borrow from Simone Weil: “We have to think that [whoever has done us harm] has not lowered us, but has revealed our true level”. A humbled West is its best opportunity to offer a renewed ultimacy of what is possible. Albeit over a coffee, or three, in a steaming coffee house, which we offer to pay for.

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Global leadership opinion: MAGA-ultras’ blue-collar economic nationalism might survive market turmoil, but will it arrest the ‘unscrupulous optimism’ of runaway meritocracies in Britain and Europe?

In Uncategorized on May 21, 2025 at 7:38 am

THE TARIFF BLITZKRIEG has done its random act of violence. Like a B-17 dropping iron bombs over an open sight, one hit the runway, another Mr McGregor’s greenhouse, the rest slugged into the quagmire. But the message has been sent. Technical dashboard politics should give way to nation-state leadership. On the sidelines traditional conservatives remain hopeful that Al and Peg Bundy’s blue-collar MAGA-ultras’ raid on their policy-position will be temporary. MAGA being a reaction to the ‘unscrupulous optimism’ of Western meritocracies’ vision of the economic life, where Al and Peg attempted to ‘live their best lives’ but found themselves fallible.

Prognosticator of an Anglo-American New Republic, H. G. Wells warned last century that Americans suffer ‘nation-state blindness’. An inability by citizens to see how their local endeavour is part of national enterprise.

According to H. G., it was this failure to connect dots that resulted in America missing the opportunity to rule with its Anglo partner. As fanciful as that is now, there is truth in the notion of America today turning inwards to connect itself to itself. For a self, even a corporeal self, such as the nation-state, is a self that is connected to… itself!

Of course, the Western-world is Anglo-Americanised, having absorbed its main export, modern-liberal-democracy. FDR-Churchill, JFK-Macmillan, a shared constitutional outlook, kept the marriage bed warm, but less so Trump-Johnson/Starmer. Affinity generated by Brexit was fleeting.

Although America has a more complex history with free trade, what has often united is a liberal hawkishness, in the British sense of the word liberal, meaning laissez faire economics, rather than the US version, meaning centre left politics. But now the social conservative pendulum has swung illiberally (in British and US senses) on both sides of The Pond, the affair is over. Like Elyot and Sibyl in Noel Coward’s Private Lives, two big egos have blown hot then cold.

What about Britain, and the political rumble in the Shires?

In truth America does not like Britain. Its leaders love invitations to Buck House, applaud Churchill’s Anglo-Saxonese, plus eating out expensively on Neville Chamberlain’s censure, when justifying foreign adventure. The new country has often been suspicious of being suckered by the trappings and flummery of ‘Great British’ power-plays. Much of American leadership-style e.g. The Oval Office candour of late, is a Protestant-idealist language-battle to defeat doublespeak and flush out insecurities about who is big or small on the world stage.

Spurned, Britain shuffles uneasily, poking its canapés, mumbling about the vigour of the vulgar younger nation. A Greece to America’s Rome, Britain fancied steering its protégé with diplomatic ear-bending. This is the self-delusion of the defeated imperialist. Trump II’s realpolitik has finally closed Britain’s fantasy of being in a special relationship.

Culturally, America and Britain are thinly separated. Both tolerant. Americans quicker-witted, Britons wittier. But since America is now led by blue-collar Republicans, Britain is further in the doghouse. Trumpists’ contempt for Britain’s and Europe’s secular-liberal-progressive political elite is undisguised.

And having exited the EU, Britain is of little strategic value. Its technical-politics, which is fundamentally watch-and-wait market-monitoring incrementalism, observes helplessly the unfolding US psychodrama. Whilst simultaneously unable to counter far-right threats to its social equilibrium. For Britain has remarkably settled communities who doggedly weather decline. But there is a political rumble in the Shires which Trumpism is fuelling.

And what is the emergent US New World vision?

Amidst D-Day-style assaults on every policy beachhead, action being totemic stateside, the uncertain vision might be: re-shape the global trading model, revive the nation-state, arrest runaway debt. Then slow, and ultimately halt, the rise of Chinese power. Emotionally, heartland voters require the US administration to draw firmer physical and spiritual boundaries around a US that has been overextended economically and militarily since the Second World War.

Of course, orthodox economics is turning various shades, largely puce. The source of this exit from globocracy is rooted in red-raw inequalities caused by the US’s out-of-control meritocracy. One that originally admitted outsiders, and appeared equal, but has morphed, and created a new money-club aristocracy. Which is not distributing ‘dignity and status’ to middle-class American families. Those who doggedly punch the hours of study and work.

For in Britain, our working-class and middle-class = America’s middle-class. The American working-class aligns more closely with the UK’s notion of an underclass. Those who are struggling to both escape precarious minimum-wage zero-hour no-contract work and pass exams.

Add to this the nature of modern politics, which has invested governance within institutional systems, a deliberate throttling of charismatic ‘man’, and has become remote. In many minds a flawed and accessible charismatic nation-state leader is morally more accountable, by virtue of visibility, than cold unresponsive iron-cage bureaucracies. American modernity (liquefying the residuum of European social systems) has peaked.

Meritocratic overreach and Trump II re-set

In essence, the US meritocratic journey has transmogrified into greed. The post-war ‘We Generation’ moved rapidly in social terms, and understood a ‘good society’ requires extending opportunities to all. But by the late-Sixties, the new ‘Me Generation’, the meritocracy winners, started pulling up the draw-bridge behind what they perceived as their success.

The civic duty to acknowledge personal good fortune, has become my effort achieved my status. The humble serendipity of having a talent the market needed at the right time, has shifted towards a hard-faced cynicism, oft portrayed as ‘toughness’. The fear of the ‘We Generation’, the very real abyss at its heels, which they staved off with gritty stoicism, has emerged magnified in their children, who say ‘no way are we sailing near to that nightmare’.

As competition became fiercer, erosion of the ‘common good’ accelerated. Capital-rich citizens have fought tooth and nail to win, and purchase access to a hot-housed VIP lane of private school>good SATS>Ivy League university>profession. The talent+hardwork nexus has shifted to money+power that propels progeny through the narrowing door labelled ‘high-paid brain work’. Stagist theory said to societies ‘stay in history’s waiting room’ until you and your community are ready to evolve together, but new capital says buy access now.

Into this ineluctable globalised market biology, the Trump II administration signals a re-set. Even if they do not know they are the vehicle for change, they embody an apotheosis for political modernity. One which was predicated on a meritocracy distributing fairly. Instead, it has fomented an inheritocracy, where capital sloshes without the handrails of shared core values.

So how might strategic value be created from economic nationalism?

The immediate challenge is to maintain the confidence of the bond market, and attempt significant savings, whilst opening new sources of revenue. And to achieve this by rolling over tax cuts and rebalancing trade. The risks are considerable, as the tariff strategy may slow growth, increase inflation, and ultimately weaken the dollar’s supremacy in the decades to come. History may not be kind to the big re-set. But the trickiest section of the report card is execution. The manner of delivering these changes has created uncertainty.

So, for the sake of a more considered strategy, some of the good intent might simply founder on the lack of plan completeness. For example, when costs are slashed, such as regulatory control, this might suggest long-term savings, but in practice, if assumptions are not tested, they might trigger major political headaches down-the-line when out-of-the-blue crises emerge. But for the ha’p’orth of tar (a tested plan) the ship (strategic value) can still be lost.

And another sagely phrase: The seeds of your demise are often sown during periods of success. So, America sits at a critical moment, some of it historic, some introduced unnecessarily in its rush to force re-modelling. America is the land of genuinely excellent strategic management, and there will be seasoned management professionals whose skillset can still settle the ship of state.

Of course, this is the view from the hilltop called classical strategic management. Although on the surface it is a dull, plodding discipline, it can still deliver careful re-engineering for America Inc., and at the same time win approval from the markets.

The spectre of an Old World social order returning to haunt the New

In the run-up to the 2008 crash ‘orthodox economics was humiliated… sophisticated financial minds hopelessly miscalculated the value of assets’. Why should classical economics read the runes this time?

There are wider forces at work, and if disrupting the world order, including orthodox economics, is required for America to bring down its stratospheric and unsustainable deficit, then client-politics of old is unlikely to have the re-engineering force of character.

Many are familiar with fire-from-the-hip business leadership relying entirely on gut-angst to bring change. Readers of John Updike, Philip Roth and Saul Bellow will recognise quotidian American realities grate with its sunshine theology. America is searching for resolving its mile-wide social dualities (e.g. failing meritocracy), but the current US administration is like the preacher, who in the sermon notes writes: ‘point weak, shout loud’. We suspect, like the new right in Europe, the rocket fuel that gets it off the launch pad is greater than the load required for the second and third stages of nation-state development.

What we might be seeing is America’s long resistance to the shadow of an Old World. A world that is complex and intractable, with its ranked social strata offering sustainable modes of living, in contrast to America’s dominant and creaking social measures of income and wealth. America holds action as more sacred than reflection. As John Maynard Keynes said at the end of his General Theory (1936) this is a sign you are held to some form of dogma. Trumpism is about action, but concurrent critical reflection will need to emerge sooner than later. Tyranny is in the absence of the ability to nuance new political positions.

Does the end of political modernity mean sailing towards the shore of classical conservatism?

Although on the surface the DeLorean is headed back to 19th century mercantilism, many are asking are we also headed towards the morally manageable boundary of nation-statism. For this is as much about America’s moral agency, its sense of self. This suggests Britain and Europe, in their commitment to sublate their nationalistic agency post-war, are wedded still to political modernity as an unquestioned philosophy. Hence, across Europe, the new right is making Trumpist-style gains, largely to arrest a runaway modernity (bureaucratic governance) that has become deaf to its concerns.

And so, the argument is that America’s New World Order is a flaming out of a dying meritocratic social contract. A traumatic admission it wishes to establish a more workable social system.

Meritocracy was the fruit of post-Cold War globalisation. Globalisation is the spread of modernity. Modernity is the liquefying of all barriers, personal and geographic, and the creation of meritocratic social order. Meritocracy is the replacement of class/tribe distinctions for the promise of personal achievement and liberation.

The flaw in this utopianism is that social groups are naturally self-organising, and left to themselves can shake out quite sustainably. Artisans cheerfully graft, bourgeois entrepreneurs buy and sell, and aristos refine their sensibilities in well-stocked country house libraries, opening the odd school and fete to boot. All too utopian, and dewy-eyed, but this old social conservative order is resurfacing in the minds of the slogging metro-dwellers sinking £2,500 rent per month into their stuffy broom cupboard apartments.

Our wobbly meritocracy is also faltering as it is run by homo technicus, loyal not to vision or even mission, or healthy social order, but policy. Bureaucracies avoid volatile human fancy, and put oversight into the hands of bloodless policy wonks. This society will not excel, but it will be fairer to a greater number. Or so we thought.

So, what’s not to like?  Well, in the West the emergence of deep inequality. The Western ship has tilted so hard towards the top 1% of achievers, that the bottom 50% are dropping behind like the wheezy pupil on the annual school cross-country race. The few winners are winning hard, and the losers are massing in large numbers. Part of the tilt is capital accumulation has increased the power of money itself. Money + a decent brain = access to a fast-lane that no-one anticipated would create a new money aristocracy, one that does not have a country pile across from the village, so is unhitched from all communitarian moods.

On the back of these broken structures is the rise of new right parties. With Trumpism offering to collapse globalisation altogether, his challenge is to steer towards the shore of classical conservatism. And avoid the rocks of nihilistic mega-meritocracy. Economic nationalism and ethno-nationalism are in the mixer and the former should avoid the latter.  The detail however, may not be written yet. This gut angst may of course have a moral taproot.

The emotionally illiterate nature of globalisation

Property values have rocketed, and with it a new mass class of millionaires. Others who could not secure property are now the new precariat. Property is out of reach unless you graduate into a graduate career, or have parents who are ‘meritocracy winners’. After five to ten years following graduation some 30% of graduates are still in non-graduate jobs.

As the Blair-Brown government told us, we had better get on board the globalisation train. And we did. It did not know where the train was ultimately destined, but was sold as heading to the land of sexy new metro-liberal coolness. We now know it was pure undifferentiated rhetoric.

We also now realise the emotionally illiterate nature of this message. What many missed is that unfettered liberalisation was an ideology for the dipsy-brained. To which politics is meant to counter. Where the British parliament enjoyed and suffered long speeches, now, members have to ‘cut to the plot’ in short shrift. Debating time has been cut so parliamentarians can get home to their families. Admirable, but naïve, when complex issues demand the sort of exhaustive dialogue as found in a major Dostoyevsky novel. Where the fog starts to clear on page 372, but you are still asking ‘who are all these people?!’.

Under successive administrations politics was gradually jettisoned as an inconvenience to market measures. Rationalism in the shape of single-metric politics, however, does not do ‘good or evil’ assessments. No-one saw the 2008 crash coming. And if they did, they were thrown out the room for their apostasy.

Meritocracies play what Peter Turchin calls the ‘game of musical chairs’. They foster competition across the whole of society, and the resulting stampede towards the remaining number of hi-status chairs generates an ever-growing mass of losers.

Added to this mud wrestling, we allowed mass immigration from southern Europe to fill our skills gap, and catastrophically failed to invest in education, as short-termism is favoured by unworldly technocrats who lack strategic instincts. This liberal world order is now breaking up violently. In short, Trumpism is displaying a controversial and upsetting symptom: Leadership.

Globalisation finds leadership per se, expensive. Leadership points out to client-politics that ‘the language of economics’ is taking over in the open society. When people talk about ‘living their best life’, asking ‘are you investing enough in your education?’, ‘have you had a productive day?’, you know homo economicus is eclipsing humanity itself. Institutions have started to become bearers of this two-dimensional message. Self-actualisation (a terrifying term in itself, and Maslow’s other writing is far better than his oversold model), started at some point to become an economic calculus primarily.

Even if deeply unpopular, leadership remains a challenge to dashboard politics, which obeys market indicators, often mindlessly. As we found in 2008. Some will call it new right authoritarianism, and even see it as creating an uber-meritocracy, but either way it is based on a measure of righteous angst about those left behind.

Possible fruits of Trumpism’s correction?

We reached peak bureaucracy at the turn of the century. The Kafkaesque nightmare of call-centres, the institutionalised West, as an assemblage of disembodied rule followers, was bodied in an untrammelled globalisation. Commodified lean service delivery (as sages of Just-In-Time supply chains like to call it) meant policy enforced rule compliance. But, the revolt against global massification of experience had begun deep in heartland communities.

From the Blair-Brown-Clinton administrations onwards it was the role of technocrats to manage the poverty slaying capital markets that lifted all ships. £1 growth in UK/US, €10 growth in Poland. Yes, employers had a free lunch as young poorly paid East Europeans flooded the UK, and wondered what was the point of investing in training when this cheap and compliant workforce did the grafting.

Zygmunt Bauman, the Polish-British sociologist, who bravely rowed back on globalisation ahead of many, termed globalised modernity’s retraction, and the era of late-capitalism, as liquid modernity. We want the fruit of solid smokestack modernity e.g. undersea cables, WiFi, and freedom to roam, but not the horror of total annihilation of the dislocated self.

The rise and rise of non-spaces, like Junction 44 of the M6, which is not a great cultural addition, provided freedom from territoriality, but also the loss of heroic potential. London is increasingly a non-space. Its museums and history have been gloriously accessible, educating me as a boy, but the slippage is visible. London’s premier Christian house, in the heart of its financial district, St Paul’s Cathedral, is a snip at £26 entry fee. Winners this way, losers round the back? The vast majority of state churches are permanently open and accessible. Lovingly curated sanctuaries display indomitable welcomes come what may.

So, the future re-set might well be achieved from retaining the fruit of technological massification, but re-locating ourselves within a re-born nation-state, its settlements (both physical and philosophical) bearing the weight of life. We do not know if Trump II’s disruption will, in two or three iterations hence, invite civic virtues, a taste for ‘the good society’, and its supporting architecture. We fear it could still unleash meritocracy Mk II. Albeit a nationalised variant.

In Europe we have suppressed nationalism for obvious reasons, but have weakened settled communities that can support those on the margins. For the nation-state is really a collection of laws. If you have arrived yesterday as an immigrant, you can hold wildly different values, but, critically, if you abide by the law, we will all get on. It is this shared respect for laws born from natural reason and history which gradually foster working settlements through highlighting mutual obligations. If the Trump II re-set reasserts this Anglo-American reality, then the bumpy ride will achieve something.

A world-citizen, reacquainted with a relational ordering of society, via a reinvigorated public sphere, where the conversation is held open by the genuinely leaderful, is a curious prospect. A space where the human stands across the square and learns to interpret the micro gestures of their interlocutors, instead of repeating the script of an unworldly technocrat. A shoddy narrative passed down the chain from a political apparatchik. Someone, somewhere, was always going to respond to the Orwellian warning that a society of technocratic party slaves will do itself no good.

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Global leadership opinion: Searching for virtues in the US administration’s New World Order

In Uncategorized on March 24, 2025 at 12:52 pm

WHEN YOU DRIVE INTO CANADA from New York State, USA there is a sense of coming home for the English traveller. Food portions are saner, grass greener, and they say ‘sorry’ nearly as much. Despite the US government’s desire to despoil Canada, I could easily be an American. Half the English spirit is spent coping with the British Isles’ maritime climate, whereas huge bright US skies make Americans admirably engaged, leaning-in, sometimes where they should. As Martin Amis says of the English, ‘If their long-lost cousin became a world-famous author and held a book-signing event next door, the English will say: ‘I might pop my head round the door, but then again…’’

The Great Plains MAGA voter propelling the new US administration’s economic nationalism, has both a grasp of their country’s constitution, and of what might be ‘the good society’. These instincts have called time on what they perceive as an opaque global system. One that extracts value from honest-sweated-labour, and pours it into snake-oil-capital-markets that fail to produce much of tangible value.

The typical American family’s relative decline in income and wealth, against a multiplying super-rich, are structural inequalities stretching back to the 1970s, and these sit at the root of American discontents. With Peter Turchin offering that where serious political candidates have failed, those prepared to “channel… popular discontent” in the most outlandish way, succeed. It is a bonus to MAGA’s grassroots that the Trump-Vance team’s ascent to power appears free from ‘shadowy-conspiracy’ and the forces of a coercive corporate-lobby. The plutocratic nature of US power is somehow overlooked for the moment.

By contrast the heartland British provincial voter has no working knowledge of their constitution, nor can they spell out any version of ‘the good society’, largely through disinterest (a survival posture). Instead, they trust their instincts (as does everybody in the final analysis). And it was the gut-led-British voter who called time on the European Union. This supranational value system could not be weighed or measured in plain sight, and bog-standard-gut-ethics doomed it to history.

This societal battle between the nomadic-world-citizen’s blind trust of market-led client-politics, and the heartland settlers’ stay-and-build commitment, was no more visible than when President Zelenskyy, in barrack-room sans-culottes, met the New World Order in the Oval Office.

One target of this reality TV moment was the liberal progressive Euro-politician. Who is now awake, and talking. The message: your defence shield has expired. American presidents have been trying and failing for fifty years to get Europe to fund its own security. Overnight the Trump-Vance administration has EU leaders committing nearly a trillion Euros on infrastructure and defence. Some going.

American pragmatism has called out Europe, which, in its moral flummery, has not stood up to Russia. It has been buying Russian oil and back-door-exporting through Central Asian states. The MAGA farmer says ‘why should I fund Euro-duplicity?’. The American heartland voter does not believe in a globalised rules-based institutional leadership. Institutions are client-politicians’ agents also, they say.

It may of course still go extremely badly for Ukraine. That the Russian war-tractor will hit full-smoke-spewing-tilt and cannot be stopped, spluttering towards Kyiv in a re-run of Saigon in 1975. But for the Trump-Vance administration to, in the parlance, ‘monster’ Ukraine’s president in the Oval Office is a reversal of principled politics. As Dag Hammarskjöld, UN secretary-general from 1953-61, put it: “Apparently easy successes with the public are possible for a juggler, but lasting results are achieved only by the patient builder.”

But, after decades of the principled global statesman and woman, and their celebrated grand servanthood, many sense these globocrats were not alert to their own complicity in letting the West drift into shallow commercial interest. And to even let it sail its gunboats unwittingly up to the front door of a wounded Russia, whose natural sense of pride makes it recoil. America’s Monroe Doctrine has no truck with foreign threats near or far.  Soviet missiles lasted 25 days on Cuban soil, and left after the threat of global nuclear conflagration. Secretly, the US pulled its own missiles from Turkey and southern Italy as the deal clincher.

For our Nebraskan farmer, she does not wish for Zelenskyy to become another client-politician. The modernist Barbara Hepworth sculpture memorial to Dag Hammarskjöld would leave many heartland voters unmoved. A symbol of unreality that permeates notions of world government. Apostles of the Enlightenment are privately contemplating how an illiterate and know-nothing political-base might just, after all, possess acute wisdom, born of life, rather than the academy.

The turn against globalisation, and its beneficial aspects, is not dissimilar to the vehement rejection of the more enduring fruits of the British Empire. Those elements of pre-WWI British power which enabled for some an idyll, including those whose dedication was marked by love, are no longer remembered. What is recalled of British involvement today, are the parts which, as Anthony Nutting, senior Foreign Office official in Anthony Eden’s government, would term, the ‘sordid conspiracies and political insanities’, such as the Suez Crisis.

Britain and France lost their empires amidst turmoil. Nutting resigned over the Suez debacle. An act which guaranteed his isolation. Few resign today as they know it is the end of both friendships and careers, as Nutting found. Rather, many plod on with repeated resurrections, compounding a moribund politics.

What might serve as a brake on the US’s rush to economic nationalism, is their reliance on imports: semi-conductors, metals, pharmaceuticals, plus an international network of military bases, integrated supplier networks, transport infrastructure, storage, and banking links. All equate to a functioning Western model that an isolationist America might send back into a pre-war world of trade bottlenecks strangling global market activity.

If an emboldened EU does get its act together, the US’s new transactional foreign policy might unwittingly boost the Euro as an international currency. If Europe takes the lead in NATO, then Japan and South Korea might seek deeper partnership with it. And it might make sense for Britain’s nuclear deterrent to further link with France in a continent-wide defence policy.

In terms of statecraft, President Zelenskyy is wise to wear his Oval Office drubbing as a gift. Be true to your humiliation, to borrow from Albert Camus. Wear it well, like a suit. Machiavelli, largely misinterpreted, offers that virtù (virtue) sits at the heart of statecraft, and any senior leader can, with suitable patience, convert their scars. There is potential to win over doubters who are newly sympathetic to your wounds, if not pleased you have crashed to earth.

Humiliation is not far from humility, which is the ground zero of enduring symbolism. And symbols run on eternal fuel, travelling around the world on your behalf. Recent poll ratings show Ukrainians maintaining substantial support for their president, and his grizzled pursuit of this miserable war.

For the US team, impatience risks them being despised for no reason. High principle still matters and if the state’s survival is not threatened, do not burn voter capital if you can help it. Markets thought the threat of tariffs were purely a negotiation lever. Since pressing the button some growth forecasts have been cut. Some analysts predict recession.

But like the pupil brought up on facts in Dickens’ Hard Times who says to Mr Gradgrind, “But surely you must know that self-interest is the law of life”, the core of this debate is the question of whether America will forget that all life in truth is a ‘complete and unlimited dependence of each of us upon the other’. Its vaunted position is the result of its constant curiosity and collaboration.

This very public Oval Office spat steers the Trump-Vance doctrine into a form of realpolitik. And the West has not seen pragmatic realism like this since Margaret Thatcher, Willy Brandt, Charles de Gaulle, and Richard Milhous Nixon.

Trickier is a sense of nihilistic patrimonialism. Operating a royal household, me and my mates, can be a blunt petulant counterforce to the state’s overshadowing bureaucratic apparatus. And it involves firing the competent, and packing your court with sycophants who are pleased to be there.

Quixotic moods mean US policy appears referent on some days to pragmatism, and on others to significant unpredictably, and this further troubles the state’s stability. It is too early to tell. The damage to state architecture is unknown. It is better if the unpredictability operates like a carnival (rule disruptor), rolling through town, and at some point, heading out the other side, allowing the streets to be restored to working order.

The West is stuck in a mire of regulation. If the USA does not wish to destroy its moral authority, take the carnival float through town, make necessary adjustments, but retain the intellectual capital within its institutions. If you smash them, it might be some time before institutional learning is restored. Business leaders think in terms of excellence cultures, but bureaucracies are sub-optimal by design.

And social strata is regularly re-shaped, but not always for the long-term good. The English ruling-class decayed steadily, its idle-rich marrying the entrepreneurial arriviste, and slowly disappeared, taking with it some of the aesthetic values needed for political judgement. As odd as that sounds. Flat meritocratic societies lack the repositories of social capital that are needed to be passed on faithfully to the next generation. America took the keys of global power about two years into the WWII, stepping over Britain’s bankrupt and bombed-out corpse. It was always going to happen.

In the realm of hegemonic stability, it is assumed we have moved from the bi-polarity of a US-Soviet balance of power, onto an unassailable US unipolarity over the past 20 years. But post-Iraq administrations have preferred strategic drift. With a vague notion the West will glide into a materialist utopia by itself. That institutions will replicate their values automatically. It is possible that future notions of bi or multi-polar worlds no longer applies.

Under a non-polar world of inter-relating global institutions, there is a heartland fear that Washington will slide into just another former locus of power. A has-been, like London and Rome. American voters’ resistance to ceding dominance to liberal-progressive globocrats leaves the stage vacant for a world led by a handful of power-brokers. Visible strong-men and women, locatable, and channelling heartland emotions and intuitions. If the good society is the sum of its intuitions, they will not be embodied by the rootless transnational bureaucrat. Dislocated officialdom is undemocratic. 

In America’s fight with global communism, much turned out to be shadow boxing. Cold War I was fought via proxy hot wars. But much was hitting and missing. In Vietnam the communist insurgency in the north turned out to be Vietnamese nationalists, fighting for their homeland rather than international socialism. There was no grand communist alliance, but rather a chimera.

Such huge misreading is down to paranoia. But in Cold War II, there is a very real alliance: Russia, North Korea, China and Iran. The Ukraine war is a basis for hard military-industrial co-operation between this bloc of power, who are entirely locatable on the map, unlike McCarthy’s ‘Reds under the bed’. Will America’s emergent doctrine of realpolitik and its transactional methodology be emotionally capable of understanding this threat?

In the UK the Brexit-behemoth awoke from hibernation in reaction to the Blair-Cameron-governments’ globalised-city-finance-public-sector-model. Politics has descended into a stoogeocracy, where genuine leadership is a threat to in-group power. Britain’s drift, morally and intellectually, showed up no more cruelly than within its attempt to monetise its Post Office retail network. Local post offices in the UK are regarded by some as second only to the local parish church, and pub, for community cohesion. The UK government’s desire to modernise required a new computer system. When anomalies in branch account balancing emerged the Post Office ended up prosecuting over 900 postmasters, with a Public Inquiry hearing that at the root of discrepancies were software errors rather than skulduggery. Regarded by UK politicians as the ‘UK’s most widespread miscarriage of justice’, journalist Nick Wallis said this public sector run institution was “stuffed to the gills with lifers, plodders and gormless apparatchiks inexplicably promoted into positions way beyond their ability.”

This ugly injustice points to under-performing institutions led by weakened governments and weaker politicians. And globalised liberal democracy has been costly in the minds of Mr & Mrs Ordinary-Tax-Payer in the UK. £800bn in taxes to bail bankers, £49bn on Iraq-Afghan Wars of Enforced Democracy (on countries that did not want Starbucks on every corner), the all-hours-working-to-buy-a-box-plus-child-in-a-for-profit-sub-standard-nursery, capped off by the self-loathing anti-Britain-anti-Western-everything narratives, adding to perceptions in heartland communities in the UK that the EU was part of the malaise. How the Trump-Vance turn against supranationalism will bring new accountability to institutions is unknown as transformational change is deeply complex.

In the US, heartland voters may be ready to accept market turmoil as a price it wishes to pay for re-balancing. Many are enjoying DOGE’s chainsaw, even if it will in reality yield limited results in deficit shrinkage. Slashing overheads is the accountant’s soft target, but when plates start crashing much gets quietly reinstated at a later date. Some unfiring has already begun.

This shifting moral terrain shows up as particularly muddy with Europe letting Ukraine and Russia’s blood and treasure disappear into the bottom of Somme-like trench warfare. The generals say they prefer to go into battle with a 10-1 advantage, and certainly not less than 3-1. Since neither side in the war has any advantage, the ‘do something’ option becomes a moral necessity. Realpolitik means Zelenskyy’s blushes in The Oval Office are momentary when an ‘endless war’ eviscerates a generation of young, and not so young, Ukrainians and Russians for no purpose whatsoever.  

And Russia’s deaths in Ukraine are staggering. Unsustainable. So why let them off the hook. Well, America’s economy is also not as strong as it looks. The US debt pile reaches to the moon. They are spending more in interest than their defence budget. Slash America Inc.’s monster spending on any wasteful secondary entanglements or it will implode economically. America is a debtor nation historically, but now it is a long way into the red-zone.

Here in Britain, we are comfortable for the moment to let Canada take one for the team. The popcorn tub is being shared as Prime Minister Mark Carney returns serve to his neighbours. We might be next. Do not upset POTUS is the current mood. If we just look at Britain’s nuclear deterrent, although it is “operationally independent” it “[relies] on a 67-year-old agreement under which America shares its nuclear technology and infrastructure with Britain”, unlike France, which is a “wholly national endeavour”.

But this is early days for all analysts. Every morning a new eye-gouging headline contradicts the previous day’s fragile trend. Leadership strategists like me are currently scanning their history books, biographies and just about every genre, for meaningful context. Two obvious entities emerge, NATO’s birth, and the rehabilitated legacy of Richard Nixon.

It is cold comfort to recall that Britain after WWII split its factory production capacity in half to fund re-arming, and to play lead partner (second fiddle) in the newly formed NATO alliance. Britain was factory to the world, its order books full, but gradually customers drifted away frustrated, as we switched to rebuilding a huge army to protect a dying Empire’s trade routes. It took Britain some time, possibly 70 years, to accept it was a bit part actor in geo-politics. The peace dividend has meant successive governments have let the UK army shrink to half its Cold War complement, bringing into question home defence let alone projecting power into the far reaches of Europe. UK defence spend rising to 3% by 2030 is essential if we are serious about NATO’s Article 5, armed response.

Newly fragile due to America’s resurgent exceptionalism, NATO now needs Britain as its champion. NATO’s raison d’être was the Soviet Union’s glowering presence. If America rehabilitates Russia into the West’s good books, this further calls Article 5 into doubt. In fact, it calls into question the array of international agreements whose ligaments formed around a shared Western worldview.

The last time such a grand scale balance of hegemonic power needed a jolt from Western leadership, Richard Nixon jumped on a plane to meet Chairman Mao and invite China in from the cold after 25 years of diplomatic non-communication. If we think it is a lot to swallow for the West to rehabilitate Vladimir Putin, Mao’s Great Leap Forward took the lives of up to 45 million people. Isolation is logical but often ineffective. Nixon’s, and more so, Henry Kissinger’s realpolitik looked past ideology and values towards the potential of reduced global threats. China’s hybrid economy, the blending of state-planning and market apparatus was the result, with the West fully embedded industrially, if not politically. This appears as the escape path for Putin, as galling as that is to swallow.

Importantly, Britain is not as politically polarised as America. Our constitution might be haemorrhaging due to successive governments’ erosion of parliamentary accountability, but we are still talking to each other with sufficient respect. So, wheeling in Homeric cyclopes to bludgeon one side or the other is unnecessary. That the Trump II team has not dissembled one jot, might give some relief. What you see is what you get. Everything externalised and nothing hidden. A world governed by transactional pragmatics, realpolitik, is with us for some time.

We get the leaders we deserve. Once Trump II has achieved a rebalancing of American interests, what next? And, if MAGA’s instincts prove more consequential to history than the globocrats’, and Trump wins the Nobel Peace Prize, then let us all eat out in Canada before the Maple syrup gets renamed Trump treacle!

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General election(s) year: UK’s social contract up for renewal… but don’t let the utopians spoil it, as we have the solution already

In Uncategorized on May 30, 2024 at 11:18 am

TRUMP HAS OVERPOWERED US politics, irrespective of November’s presidential election result. How? Encounter, recognition, participation. Great Campaigners offer these in bucket-loads. More immediately a Republican presidency is seen as holing-below-the-waterline the Pax Americana. Teasing that the US will no longer guarantee the Western Alliance. This is the Republican’s ‘pumped-social-contract’, boilerplating anti-statist Jack Reacher-style ‘toothbrush and bus-ticket’ freedoms. A turn of the lens for a more defined American-self but fundamentally a retention of a red-hot market social-contract.

Here in the UK we sense more unsettled moods. We have no Great Campaigners. Turgidly technocratic lawmakers, armed with big spanners, the law, offer to access sub-structures of society to ‘fix the model’. Hammering under the bonnet (hood) currently extends from conscription to nationalisation. All this noise means the UK social-contract needs more than just US-style tweaks; it is up for renewal.

Britain leapt away from the US’s market-model after the war. It had to. Memories of squalor in the 1920s and 30s laid the ground for a post-war consensus. A commitment to full-employment and a truce with the unions was fraying badly by the mid-1970s, allowing Margaret Thatcher’s use of the market as a US-style social lever. Access to capital via debt would enable the purchase of property and even justice, via a right-rudder-turn back to Lockean freedom and its individualised society.

When Thatcher said ‘there is no society’, in an interview for Woman’s Own magazine in 1987, what she meant was it did not exist as an entity capable of action. In this sense she was right. Agency sits with you and me, the family, civil society (groups) and institutions. But, wrong in the sense that the village did actually exist as a coherent entity for social transformation. People did share resources temporal and spiritual, and hoicked the resistant into surrounding fields.

Thatcher’s social-contract has now run its course. As French economist Thomas Piketty infers, the power of capital has grown to such an extent as to unsettle our settlements; the places we live and be. We can’t quite put our finger on it, but our divide might well be the power of money itself. It buys more than it should. Social background is less the prime determinant of life-course in the UK, and increasingly access to capital is. Within communities some face serious jeopardy, whilst a neighbour from the same social contour is existentially safe. Neither lacked industry. In the free market, there are winners and losers; but should it be so? The cause of this fissure: the Rate of return on capital is overtaking economic Growth to the extent this has unbalanced normal power relations across communities.

The last time such seismic social tremors rumbled was the 1970s. The slogan in the run up to the 1974 General Election was “Who governs Britain?”, the unions or government. Industrial strife (weak management and powerful unions) ripped through the post-war consensus and laid the egg for Thatcher’s ’79 victory and the rebirth of economic liberalism, through privatisation of state assets; albeit restrained by commitment to the NHS and welfarism.

When political polar opposites Tony Benn (socialist grandee) and Sir Keith Joseph (centrist conservative turned architect of Thatcher’s policies) met on a train in the early 1980s Benn’s diary suggests they both agreed on one thing: Britain had made a mess of its post-war recovery. That sense of mess has arisen again, along with those willing to perform extreme surgery.

On the fringes there is a heady nostalgia among right-wing utopians to roll back 20th century constitutional reforms, starting with New Labour’s legacy (The Supreme Court, quango-Britain e.g. monetary policy committee), and onto the NHS, welfare state, and eventually taking the DeLorean back to a pre-WWI social contract.

It adds that devolution is a disaster. It says this as it believes a sovereign representative Parliament is the only fora for stable polity. Any delegation to sub-bodies results in ideas untested by the sandblasting of parliamentary debate, and will compound the constitutional muddle we are currently in.

What is the muddle? A clan society of special interest groups, a fudge of rights over responsibilities. A citizenry lacking courage and candour. A nanny-state run by technocrats (siloed administrators), rather than clear-sighted visionaries. No encounter, recognition or participation (ERP).

Again, this suffers the tyranny of the absence of nuance. We are a stunning economy that has managed decline in our industrial leadership since c. 1900. Social mobility has been remarkable. And it is ongoing. GDP has ticked along steadily.

Although it would be fair to say we have under-performed when we consider Britain’s contribution to the world in preceding centuries, our influence globally remains astonishing. But maybe now is the time to shake-out our constitutional skeleton.

Of course, that process has already begun. We came out of Europe because Europe was the future, once. It is not now. The Suez Crisis had brought down the imperial ceiling and in the 50s and 60s we stared up through broken roof tiles. Europe was the passing coracle and has enchanted us constitutionally for nearly five decades.  

But now we must not let the miserable right or left-wing utopians undermine the story. Misery finds company. Utopians are prone to frothing palms. US Republicans fear our apparent weak-tea landscape. They say a wild spirit is better than no spirit at all. But remember, America does not have the UK’s social fabric. One formed through long arcs of change cycles that America is yet to enjoy.

America is a money-society, and this is only a temporary contract. As American builds its institutions, it will move from pure liberal modus to a new diversity in its social complexity. Europe’s ancient and modern institutions offer us an inheritance that America is still evolving. No point in an entrepreneurial society if it does not leave any legacy for the next generation. If you have to keep rebuilding the citadel in every cycle then this is hardly solidarity with past or future.

England especially is a class-based society. That is, unmeritocratic.  Every revolutionary utopian throughout history thinks a social system can be destroyed and replaced. This has not worked anywhere. The US constitution is based on the English constitution; freedoms drawn down directly from the English social contract.

And the notion of class tends to suggest that the English working class is the bottom of a caste-system. It is not. To be ‘working class’ is no poor relation to notions of upper or middle ranks. As the class-system reflects values, and values reflect preferred worldviews, and worldviews are residues of inheritance. A society that has interplay of differing worldviews is at home with itself. It has an historic repository for ready use. We flatten this at our peril.

But there is a great deal in current constitutional concerns and a recalibration is due. A courageous society evolves by giving space to local fora. Local disputation travels to London in the Member of Parliament’s satchel for resolution; but under a bicameral legislature party whips drain the blood. And my argument here is social systems present in the UK are well-placed to deliver ERP. We are a civic society at heart so the utopian right need not blow hard. But their concerns do need addressing.

We can lay at the door of quango-government a weak-tea Parliament and excessively technocratic institutions. A restoring of parliamentary debate is due, but devolution and local political engagement is necessary. Oddly, the root to re-invigorating UK plc, is through grassroots politics and investment. The first step in this of course was Brexit.

The next step is recognising utopian right-wing liberal reform will not benefit the regions. London-centricity dogs the UK, and nostalgia for putting eggs into a dominant London-John-Bull-basket misses the opportunity to make the regions centres of both political and financial innovation.

Worth reminding that 120 years ago the UK-citizen had no contact with the state. Unless falling foul of George Dixon, the common-sense copper, who saw you on your way. The inner-angst of our entanglement with Big Institution is relatively new. Hence a supranational EU offered deep confusion for the Anglo-spheric self. Our social centre of gravity is local; the village is our Grand Model. Cities as ultimate destinations have worked themselves out of our system.

But domestic reform sits in the shadow of threats abroad. UK/Europe is likely to increase its defence spending from two to three percent. UK defence spending was averaging 2.5% between WWI and WWII.

The cracks in the Long Peace are widened by a red-hot US economy. It has seen off seismic shocks, from the 2008 Crash to Covid. Europe has absorbed enough Coca-Colanisation, preferring its humanism to US hubris. A New World Order is shaking out. America has caught its second-wind under Trump’s influence.

But, rapprochement with its enemies has failed. Even if Biden is returned, it is gearing up to be America Mk II: The Retreat. It will be dragged back from this by a Russia/China axis, but won’t come easily given the social underbelly exposed by the Republicans. And a non-allied Britain looks on, asking to hitch a ride on the US’s hegemonic success.

At home various sirens are calling for a Republican-style-contract. Some UK right-wing politicians have been re-born into this vacancy. This is not surprising. Some will wish to quarry-blast the UK from welfarism into a US-style warfare economy. Post-Thatcher Britain has had a succession of vanilla leaders who have not yet escaped the ‘broken middle’ of politics. Whereas America fears the zombie-economies of Europe.

The post-war consensus was like a boxer’s clinch between labour unions and government. This did not necessarily mean we were doing too bad economically, but when we looked across The English Channel, we felt queasy. John Bull was The Sick Man of Europe. We were being outrun. This sense of comparative failure, ultimately gave rise to Thatcher’s Thatcherism. Out with social consensus at home, and in with market liberalism. Her Victorian Christian conservatism, a tautology, a veneer. Whilst preaching kitchen sink conservation, she set in train market liberalism that unlocked forces unknown.

Back in the 70s détente plus sabre-rattling was the order of the day. Chancellor Willy Brandt had tipped West Germany further westward, underpinning the Atlantic Alliance, whilst simultaneously reaching out to The East (Ostpolitik). Such was the man.

Britain had meandered into the European Union (née EEC). And subsequently spent its time trying to get its fingers out of this woodchipper. The European Exchange Rate (Black Wednesday) and single-currency opt out (Maastricht Treaty) were close-run things. Britain was always ‘out’, as it was never ‘in’.

Britain’s Vietnam, The Suez Crisis, had a seismic impact on British politics up through into the 1960s. As Britain pootled, West Germany and France motored economically. An uneasy social compact looked eagerly to state-planning and Europe. Although Britain’s Labour Party had inaugurated this new post-war social contract (universal healthcare and welfare safety net), it was the Conservative Party that was seen as the most committed to its preservation through the 1950s, having been re-elected three-times-in-a-row in that decade.

And here we are now. Between old and new consensuses. Enemies of The West see a lack of guiding principle. After the war communism galvanised Western powers. Then al Qaeda.  But now we are strangely divided. The EU’s federal spirit will come up against Russian imperialism. As in the Balkans the EU will turn to NATO. Brexit empowers Germany in particular to loosen its commitment to US-leadership but when it attempts combined operations with EU partners against Russian forces reality will arrive tout de suite.

Winston Churchill in the latest of multiple revisions of his political career emerges as increasingly far-sighted. We study Churchill regularly because the emotional outfall of WWII meant we could not grasp easily the period in the run up to the war with sufficient detachment. The totemic image obscured the record. As we delve into the detail around his decisions, his modus grows as a siren of war-preparation and détente. His willingness to surround himself with opponents on the eve of The Battle of Britain, and contemplate the unthinkable, a deal with “that man” (Hitler), and allow appeasement voices space to speak, remains the mark of the prophetic. Prophets mirror ‘the people’ to the people. In other words speak the intuitions the people cannot voice themselves. And Churchill saw the value of painful dialogue.

Clement Attlee, Churchill’s war-time deputy and political opponent, suggests Churchill’s greatest gift was largely speaking, or speeching. The coalescing force of his narrative invited Britain into shared struggle, having allowed it to seriously contemplate coming-to-terms with Hitler in May 1940. Churchill could see Hitler was mad. And that is the right word I am afraid. Not least the majority of the world could not see the madness until some time later. Great efforts to explain Hitler have failed. Only madness fits. That human potential to lose humanity exists.

But I do not believe Churchill would have advised Western powers to camp on Russia’s doorstep so clumsily, provoking Putin into an offensive posture, as has NATO. Moral authority rests on simultaneous détente and war-preparation. Churchill’s early involvement in fostering a welfare state, through to his stamp of recommendation for a united states of Europe were typical of his insight. Albeit the latter probably without Britain’s involvement. It was rapprochement between France and Germany that mattered most, and he spoke for it.

Wars come and go. But long unvoiced years of private misery in the 30s sit deeply in the collective psyche, more so than WWII itself. Baby Boomers can recall squalor. Britain’s liberal economy lacked the structure to distribute the largesse from global trade and smoke-stack industry. The expanded public sector distributes wealth to its poorest communities by employing nurses and public officials to, in a real sense, manage decline.

Any post-war UK vision still cannot yet contemplate genuinely radical policies for fear of return to 30s level unemployment and poverty. Thatcher and the labour unions tried very hard to break free into new ideological paths, but events pulled these radicals back to the slow-growth economy that we have today.

It is important to read Orwell’s The Road to Wigan Pier alongside its contemporaneous work, English Journey, J. B. Priestley’s travelogue. Where Orwell’s portrayal leaves us wrung out by the effects of a mining community locked inside its own world, Priestley cheerfully meanders around England seeing other visions in that period. He sees the ribbon communities living in new build properties. Semi-detached land that brought an economically divided northern and southern Britain into a shared social experience, outside the farmer’s cottage or miner’s back-to-back house.

Oddly, Britain has always had the answer to change within these varied settled communities: civil society. Enshrined in the heart of its national personality it is a principle that gets buried within the denseness of the British constitution. The freedom to associate. The story of Britain is less one of nationalistic fervour and flag-waving, but the nature of its legal system. A citizen’s freedom to appeal to the court in order to protect its civic ventures.

And it is the return to civic entrepreneurship to which all change paths lead. The 2008 crash, Covid, Brexit, and possibly more significantly Thomas Piketty’s (r) and (g): the R-ate of return on capital surpassing economic G-rowth is deeply unsettling. Old-fashioned sweaty labour looks variable when compared to inheriting your parent’s house in the south east of England, and investing it.

So we have the answer within: civic adventurism. Backed by the state. The British Century (1815-1914) put its fingerprints across the modern world. Its industrial and military might are but a memory, but its cultural and political outputs, from the English language to its political legacy, underwrote the globalising of liberal democracy. Last century was The American Century. America’s style of government and its notions of freedom a continuation of the English constitutional model. This Anglo-spheric social contract grew into a boilerplate for The Western Settlement. A model of government and society that ultimately sealed the fate of both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

This century is up for grabs. With Britain withdrawing from the EU it won’t be the European century again.  The Belle Epoque of seemingly unassailable European hi-culture shattered, along with British ascendency in 1914. As the Russian, German, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires were replaced by a new world order of re-drawn boundaries and near-universal suffrage.

The essence of this Settlement remains ‘English induction’. The world built upwards and outwards from the particular to the general. One of the more obscure reasons that Britain withdrew from the EU was the tension between its legal systems. For the English in particular its moral authority rested on the ‘common law’ of England. This was the ‘law of the land’, and not of kings, queens or later the political visions of European courts. The local English court and judge found its reasoning in the particularities of each case. The prime concern was to do what is right irrespective of grand principles.

Fairness grew out of these situated realities, grounded in the law of the land. It was not to be muddied by the passions of the monarch or political vision, such as European federalisation. As the European project was a mass of political visions the provincial English felt their very basis of fairness being replaced by an alien code. The English reacquainted themselves with the Magna Carta, and its assurances the king was subject to the law. For the English the law protected freedom and their suspicion of Europeanness was its ties to a Grand March, with life deducted from remote hi-principle.

The English wanted the law to protect their very eccentric individuality, not turn them towards a utopian dream. If you wonder why the English resist any mass indoctrination, it is this long weddedness to the law of reason rooted in the land, in nature itself. This of course means nationalism is of limited value. The nation is secondary to the law’s protection of fairness and freedom.

This goes some way to explain America’s attachment to the gun. The overriding principle of defence of local territory was first mooted amongst the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic peoples. The individual had even then recourse to a court, whose decisions bound the king also. For the Anglosphere parliament emerged as a law-making body, and underpinned local court decisions rather than overrode. So politicians and kings are not above their citizens. Kings are under sufferance. What flag symbol appears on the English national soccer team kit ruffles some but not all. Monarchs do the heavy lifting in constitutional monarchies, not banners.

When the European Parliament did start distributing rights, detached from local decision-making, here was the fork in the road between the English and European horizons. Once the European Court of Human Rights confers a right, one not rooted in a local court, the psychological pain of a free self that is not obligated within a territory, grows painfully. Once we exit the local community’s mutual obligatory requirements, and turn to making demands of duty on others to whom exists no reciprocal arrangement there is a sense of danger flashing. Rights and duties must be born within a shared space of mutual obligation otherwise further power imbalances will tear social ligaments.

The ability of a local court to be fair to you, must not be easily trumped by the another individual carrying rights obtained elsewhere, outside that court’s jurisdiction. The universal human right versus natural reason sit in continued tension. The Anglosphere pull towards natural law, the revolutionary European Union seeks a politicised European citizen, carrying their rights across borders, unrooted from any local commitment.

As Austrian exile Stefan Zweig, writing from his home in Britain in 1942: “My childhood… before the First World War [was]… the Golden Age of Security. Everything in our Austrian Monarchy, then almost a thousand years old, seemed built to last, and the state itself was the ultimate guarantor of durability.”

Zweig stands appalled as his world collapses overnight in the 1930s, under tyranny. And reminds that weak constitutions are blown away in weeks, if not days. If there is no encounter, recognition and participation at the local level, others will offer it.

If we have travelled from a pre-war warfare-society, through a post-war consensus and a market-experiment, what next? The sub-text of this summer’s UK General Election is: Who leads, Big State or me? The long-game answer is: the ‘Royal We’ via civic innovation supported by the state. The state gradually transferring new agency to regional political and financial hubs. The NHS and welfare safety nets are retained. The original vision of both was to brush down the battered human and refit for occupation, not to put talent on the shelf.